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Abstract
With the rise of social media, people can now
form relationships and communities easily re-
gardless of location, race, ethnicity, or gender.
However, the power of social media simulta-
neously enables harmful online behavior such
as harassment and bullying. Cyberbullying is
a serious social problem, making it an impor-
tant topic in social network analysis. Machine
learning methods can potentially help provide
better understanding of this phenomenon, but
they must address several key challenges: the
rapidly changing vocabulary involved in cyber-
bullying, the role of social network structure, and
the scale of the data. In this study, we propose a
model that simultaneously discovers instigators
and victims of bullying as well as new bullying
vocabulary by starting with a corpus of social
interactions and a seed dictionary of bullying
indicators. We formulate an objective function
based on participant-vocabulary consistency. We
evaluate this approach on Twitter and Ask.fm
data sets and show that the proposed method can
detect new bullying vocabulary as well as victims
and bullies.
1. Introduction
Social media has significantly changed the nature of so-
ciety. Our ability to connect with others has been mas-
sively enhanced, removing boundaries created by location,
gender, age, and race. However, the benefits of this
hyper-connectivity also come with the enhancement of
detrimental aspects of social behavior. Cyberbullying is
an example of one such behavior that is heavily affecting
the younger generations (Boyd, 2014). The Cyberbullying
2016 ICML Workshop on #Data4Good: Machine Learning in
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Figure 1. Survey Statistics on Cyberbullying Experiences. Data
collected and visualized by the Cyberbullying Research Center
(http://cyberbullying.org/).
Research Center defines cyberbullying as “willful and
repeated harm inflicted through the use of computers, cell
phones, and other electronic devices.” Like traditional
bullying, cyberbullying occurs in various forms. Examples
include name calling, rumor spreading, threats, and sharing
of private information or photographs.1,2 Even seemingly
innocuous actions such as supporting offensive comments
by “liking” them can be considered bullying (Wang et al.,
2009). As stated by the National Crime Prevention Coun-
cil, around 50% of American young people are victimized
by cyberbullying. According to the American Academy of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, victims of cyberbullying
have strong tendencies toward mental and psychiatric dis-
orders (American Academy of Child Adolescent Psychia-
try, 2016). In extreme cases, suicides have been linked to
cyberbullying (Goldman, 2010; Smith-Spark, 2013). The
phenomenon is widespread, as indicated in Fig. 1, which
plots survey responses collected from students. These facts
make it clear that cyberbullying is a serious health threat.
Machine learning can be useful in addressing the cyber-
bullying problem. Recently, various studies considered
supervised, text-based cyberbullying detection, classifying
1http://www.endcyberbullying.org
2http://www.ncpc.org/cyberbullying
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social media posts as ‘bullying ’or ‘non-bullying’. Training
data is annotated by experts or crowdsourced workers.
Since bullying often involves offensive language, text-
based cyberbullying detection studies often use curated
swear words as features, augmenting other standard text
features. Then, supervised machine learning approaches
train classifiers from this annotated data (Yin et al., 2009;
Ptaszynski et al., 2010; Dinakar et al., 2011).
We identify three significant challenges for supervised
cyberbullying detection. First, annotation is not an easy
task. It requires expertise about culture, examination of
the social structure of the individuals involved in each
interaction. Because of the difficulty of labeling these of-
ten subtle distinctions between bullying and non-bullying,
there is likely to be disagreement among labelers, making
costs add up quickly for a large-scale problem. Second,
reasoning about which individuals are involved in bullying
should do joint, or collective, classification. E.g., if we
believe a message from A to B is a bullying interaction,
we should also expect a message from A to C to have
an increased likelihood of also being bullying. Third,
language is rapidly changing, especially among young
populations, making the use of static text indicators prone
to becoming outdated. Some curse words have completely
faded away or are not as taboo as they once were, while new
slang is frequently introduced into the culture. These three
challenges suggest that we need a dynamic methodology to
collectively detect emerging and evolving slurs with only
weak supervision.
In this paper, we introduce an automated, data-driven
method for cyberbullying identification. The eventual goal
of such work is to detect such harmful behaviors in social
media and intervene, either by filtering or by providing
advice to those involved. Our proposed learnable model
takes advantage of the fact that the data and concepts
involve relationships. We train this relational model in a
weakly supervised manner, where human experts provide
a small seed set of phrases that are highly indicative
of bullying. Then the algorithm finds other bullying
terms by extrapolating from these expert annotations. In
other words, our algorithm detects cyberbullying from key-
phrase indicators. We refer to our proposed method as the
participant-vocabulary consistency (PVC) model; It seeks
a consistent parameter setting for all users and key phrases
in the data that characterizes the tendency of each user to
harass or to be harassed and the tendency of a key phrase
to be indicative of harassment. The learning algorithm
optimizes the parameters to minimize their disagreement
with the training data which are highly indicative bullying
phrases in messages between specific users.
A study by ditchthelabel.org (2013) found that Facebook,
YouTube, Twitter, and Ask.fm are the platforms that have
the most frequent occurrences of cyberbullying. To evalu-
ate the participant-vocabulary consistency method, we ran
our experiments on Twitter and Ask.fm data. From a list
of highly indicative of bullying key phrases, we subsample
small seed sets to train the algorithm. We then examine the
participant-vocabulary consistency method to see how well
it recovers the remaining, held-out set of indicative phrases.
Additionally, we extract the detected most bullying phrases
and qualitatively verify that they are in fact examples of
bullying.
2. Related Work
There are two main branches of research related to our
topic. One of them is online harassment and cyberbullying
detection; the other one is associated with automated
vocabulary discovery. Various studies have used fully
supervised learning to classify bully posts from non-bully
posts. Many of them focus on the textual features of
post to identify cyberbullying incidents (Dinakar et al.,
2011; Ptaszynski et al., 2010; Hosseinmardi et al., 2015;
Chen et al., 2012; Margono et al., 2014). Some of them
use other features than only textual features, for example
content, sentiment, and contextual features (Yin et al.,
2009), the number, density and the value of offensive
words (Reynolds et al., 2011), or the number of friends,
network structure, and relationship centrality (Huang &
Singh, 2014). Nahar et al. (2013) used semantic and
weighted features; they also identify predators and victims
using a ranking algorithm. Many studies have been applied
machine learning techniques to better understand social-
psychological issues such as bullying. They used data sets
such as Twitter, Instagram and Ask.fm to study negative
user behavior (Bellmore et al., 2015; Hosseinmardi et al.,
2014a;b).
Various works use query expansion to extend search
queries to dynamically include additional terms. For
example, Massoudi et al. (2011) use temporal information
as well as co-occurrence to score the related terms to
expand the query. Mahendiran et al. propose a method
based on probabilistic soft logic to grow a vocabulary using
multiple indicators (e.g., social network, demographics,
and time).
3. Proposed Method
To model the cyberbullying problem, for each user ui,
we assign a bully score bi and a victim score vi. The
bully score measures how much a user tends to bully
others; likewise, victim score indicates how much a user
tends to be bullied by other users. For each feature wk,
we associate a feature-indicator score that represents how
much the feature is an indicator of a bullying interaction.
47
Cyberbullying Identification Using Participant-Vocabulary Consistency
Each feature represents the existence of some descriptor
in the message, such as n-grams in text data. The sum
of senders bullying score and receivers victim score (bi +
vi) specifies the message’s social bullying score, which
our model aims to make consistent with the vocabulary-
based feature score. We formulate a regularized objective
function that penalizes inconsistency between the social
bullying score and each of the feature scores.
J(b,v,w;λ) =
λ
2
(||b||2 + ||v||2 + ||w||2)+
1
2
∑
m∈M
 ∑
k:wk∈f(m)
(
bs(m) + vr(m) − wk
)2 (1)
Learning is then an optimization problem over parameter
vectors b, v, and w. The consistency penalties are
determined by the structure of the social data. We include
information from an expert-provided initial seed of highly
indicative bully words. We require these seed features to
have a high score, adding the constraint:
min
b,v,w
J(b,v,w;λ) s.t. wk = 1.0, ∀k : xk ∈ S. (2)
We refer to this model as the participant-vocabulary consis-
tency model because we optimize the consistency of scores
computed based on the participants of each social interac-
tion as well as the vocabulary used in each interaction. The
objective function Eq. (1) is not jointly convex; However,
if we optimize each parameter vector in isolation, we then
solve convex optimizations with closed form solutions.
The optimal value for each parameter vector given the
others can be obtained by solving for their zero-gradient
conditions. The update for bully score vector b is:
arg min
bi
J =
∑
m∈M |s(m)=i
∑
k∈f(m)
(
wk − |f(m)|vr(m)
)
λ+
∑
m∈M |s(m)=i
|f(m)|
where {m ∈ M |s(m) = i} is the set of messages that are
sent by user i, and |f(m)| is the number of n-grams in the
message m. The closed-form solution for optimizing with
respect to victim score vector v is
arg min
vj
J =
∑
m∈M |r(m)=j
∑
k∈f(m)
(wk − |f(m)|bi)
λ+
∑
m∈M |r(m)=j
|f(m)|
where {m ∈ M |r(m) = j} is the set of messages sent to
user j. The word score vector w can be updated with
arg min
wk
J =
∑
m∈M |k∈f(m)
(
br(m) + vs(m)
)
λ+ |{m ∈M |k ∈ f(m)}| .
Figure 2. ROC curve of recovered target words for Ask.fm (top)
and Twitter (bottom).
The set {m ∈M |k ∈ f(m)} indicates the set of messages
that contain the kth feature or n-gram. The strategy
of fixing some parameters and solving the optimization
problem for the rest of parameters known as alternating
least-squares. Our algorithm iteratively updates each of
parameter vectors b, v, and w until convergence. The
output of the algorithm is the bully and victim score of all
the users and the bully score of all the words.
4. Experiments
We ran our experiments on Twitter and Ask.fm data.
To collect our Twitter data set, we first collected tweets
using words from our curse word dictionary; then we use
snowball sampling from these profane tweets to collect
additional messages. Since we want to consider messages
between users, we are interested in @-replies, in which one
user directs a message to another or answers a post from
another user. From our full data set, we remove the tweets
which are not part of any such conversation, all retweets
and duplicate tweets. After the data collection and post-
processing, our Twitter data set contains 180,355 users and
296,308 tweets.
Ask.fm is a social question-answering service, where users
post questions on the profiles of other users. We use part
of the Ask.fm data set collected by Hosseinmardi et al.
(2014b). They used snowball sampling, collecting user
profiles and a complete list of answered questions. We
remove all the question-answer pairs where the identity of
the questioner is hidden. Our Ask.fm data set consists of
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Table 1. Identified bullying bigrams detected by participant-
vocabulary consistency from Twitter and Ask.fm data sets.
Data Set Selected High-Scoring Words
Twitter sh*tstain arisew, c*nt lying, w*gger,
commi f*ggot, sp*nkbucket lowlife,
f*cking nutter, blackowned whitetrash,
monster hatchling, f*ggot dumb*ss,
*ssface mcb*ober, ignorant *sshat
Ask.fm total d*ck, blaky, ilysm n*gger, fat sl*t,
pathetic waste, loose p*ssy, c*cky b*stard,
wifi b*tch, que*n c*nt, stupid hoee,
sleep p*ssy, worthless sh*t, ilysm n*gger
41,833 users and 286,767 question-answer pairs.
We compare our method with two baselines. The first
is co-occurrence. All words or bigrams that occur in
the same tweet as any seed word are given the score 1,
and all other words have score 0. The second baseline is
dynamic query expansion (DQE) (Ramakrishnan et al.,
2014). DQE extracts messages containing seed words, then
computes the document frequency score of each word. It
then iterates selection of the k highest-scoring keywords
and re-extraction of relevant messages until it reaches a
stable state.
We evaluate performance by considering held out words
from our full curse word dictionary as the relevant target
words. We measure the true positive rate and the false posi-
tive rate, computing the receiver order characteristic (ROC)
curve for each compared method. Fig. 2 contains the ROC
curves for both Twitter and Ask.fm. Co-occurrence only
indicates whether words co-occur or not, so it forms a
single point in the ROC space. Our PVC model and DQE
compute real-valued scores for words and generate curves.
DQE produces very high precision, but does not recover
many of the target words. However, co-occurrence detects
a high proportion of the target words, but at the cost of
also recovering a large fraction of non-target words. PVC
is able to recover a much higher proportion of the target
words comparing DQE. PVC enables a good compromise
between recall and precision.
We also compute the average score of target words, non-
target words, and all of the words. If the algorithm
succeeds, the average target-word score should be higher
than the overall average. For both Twitter and Ask.fm,
our proposed PVC model can capture target words much
better than baselines. We measured how many standard
deviations the average target-word score is above the over-
all average. For Twitter, PVC provides a lift of around
1.5 standard deviations over the overall average, while
DQE only produces a lift of 0.242. We also observe the
same behavior for Ask.fm: PVC learns scores that have a
defined lift between the overall average word score and the
average target word score (0.825). DQE produces a small
lift (0.0099). Co-occurrence has no apparent lift.
By manually examining the 1,000 highest scoring words,
we find many seemingly valid bullying words. These de-
tected curse words include sexual, sexist, racist, and LGBT
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) slurs. Table 1 lists
some of these high-scoring words from our experiments.
The PVC algorithm also computes bully and victim scores
for users. By studying the profiles of highly scored
victims in Ask.fm, we noticed that some of these users do
appear to be bullied. This happens in Twitter as well, in
which some detected high scoring users are often using
offensive language in their tweets. Fig. 3 shows some
bullying comments to an Ask.fm user and her responses,
all of which contain offensive language and seem highly
inflammatory.
Figure 3. Example of an Ask.fm conversation containing possible
bullying and heavy usage of offensive language.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the participant-vocabulary con-
sistency method to simultaneously discover victims, insti-
gators, and vocabulary of words indicates bullying. Start-
ing with seed dictionary of high-precision bullying indica-
tors, we optimize an objective function that seeks consis-
tency between the scores of the participants in each interac-
tion and the scores of the language use. For evaluation, we
perform our experiments on data from Twitter and Ask.fm,
services known to contain high frequencies of bullying.
Our experiments indicate that our method can successfully
detect new bullying vocabulary. We are currently working
on creating a more formal probabilistic model for bullying
to robustly incorporate noise and uncertainty.
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